好意外那篇會這麼紅= = 還有1949美國談論推翻島上中國人政權的部分原文

(這篇看誰可以幫我把小屋連結放上ptt有人轉貼的討論串，他們說想看原文，我這裡有原文)




......=_=......

那只是我前幾天拍照上傳了一些我看到覺得很勁爆的解密檔案而已.....

完全沒想到會整個.....這麼....「熱烈」

用手機看臉書都還看到有人分享那篇......那甚至不是我正在寫的相關長篇文章，也不是一個完成品，就只是放出一點資料

書名是《保衛大台灣的美援》，三民書局買的到，寫得非常好，不像一些黨國學者，怎麼說，你如果翻閱大概上世紀中葉的中國人學者的論述，你會發現他們很難以精準的敘事或者做精準的邏輯推論，不光是只有黨國的愚民宣傳，就算你覺得很中肯的也有這問題，表示這是全面性的情況

黨國意識形態就是那個年代的產物，舉例說，當年「中國式的情報」如George H. Kerr.在《Formosa Betrayed》所說，中國軍人提供給美軍的二戰時台灣情報，竟然是他們自己幻想地而且跟現實差很多，如說某某港口完全沒船等，美軍偵察機一看發現不得了那個港口滿滿是船而且超活躍，甚至中國人還自己幻想出一個不存在的島嶼，甚至拿清朝時期對台灣的認知來幻想情報 (如原住民控制區不再管轄範圍等等)，這可是戰爭的情報部門喔，表示當代中國人是缺乏精準敘事和思考、邏輯推論的能力。

更精確地舉例，我前陣子買一本黨國學者寫的國際戰略書籍，言詞間沒幾句話就要「硬」插入反西方陰謀論，那很明顯欠缺足夠依據，而且要說的話爭議也很大，這樣「缺乏足夠路徑」卻要「硬推」過去，就是有瑕疵的推斷，那本書從頭到尾都是這問題，我就丟垃圾桶了，還不能退錢，氣死，真的是垃圾書

黨國愚民教育擁護者一定看那種與黨國講法不符的書籍很不爽，但至少我在該書裡面沒看到上述黨國學者的問題 (這也說明了黨國年代，有些人可以靠關係進入學術界，才會有寫那種低能東西的人竟然是「學者」，而且還不是只有這個

那位轉貼去PTT的先生好像忘了轉貼我後半段關於"當年的"中華民國1945年後在台灣做的「好事」導致1950年代的貧窮和飢荒、中華民國不具台灣主權的證據等部分......比如這兩段↓

中華民國在台灣的1945~1960年的「真實」所作所為，怎麼掠奪壓迫殺害台灣人，甚至跟我們祖先打過全台血戰，這些事情是只要是個人類都會感到極端憤怒的。(請注意我這裡特別強調「真實」，看我文章關於李國鼎部分你就懂了，這只是冰山一角)

我補充說，中華民國一直把台灣1950年代的極端貧困說是二戰破壞，但根據美國當年駐台副領事美國白人 George H. Kerr 所寫的書籍《Formosa Betrayed》說，當時台灣基礎設施雖被破壞，但工廠等大多數保持良好，理當可以迅速重建起來。真正導致台灣從戰前亞洲先進之列 (要質疑來源的話這是美國人說的喔，以及台灣學界最近也靠攏向這派) ，倒成1950年代的貧困事實上是中國民國在台灣的劫掠壓榨，比如大量拆卸工廠物資設備去上海變賣導致大量企業消失 (1930年代後台灣是日本前進南洋的「工業重鎮」，如李國鼎1951年任職的台船公司就是掠奪自日治時期的台灣船渠株式會社，請注意這是歷史課本說不存在於當年台灣的「重工業」)、掠奪所有民營企業也就是公營企業和黨營企業來源，排擠台灣人就業，因為只給「中國難民」任職，沒看過甘蔗的中國人可以直接當糖廠廠長等，這對當時台灣經濟是毀滅性的；台灣二二八之前的史上最嚴重飢荒不是中華民國說的二戰破壞導致農作物歉收，而是中華民國強行運走所有米糧造成的，我這裡的資料來源是學界論文(page.101，註解處) 而非黨國愚民宣傳或小道消息，太多可怕的黑暗真相被埋藏在中華民國的歷史後，我看完這些後我的結論是，中華民國的歷史跟北韓是一樣等級的，可能還超過。

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書上的原文在這↓

https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1949v09/d402


美國國務院政策計劃處主任Kennan向國務卿提出的PPS53計畫書《美國對台灣和澎湖政策》，這是要排除中華民國在台灣的統治


It now seems that there is little likelihood that the policy set forth in NSC 37/1, 37/2 and 37/5 will attain our major objective with respect to Formosa and the Pescadores—the denial of the islands to the Communists through their separation from Chinese mainland control. The situation in Formosa and the Pescadores is degenerating along lines which probably, though perhaps not for two or three years or perhaps in a matter of months, will culminate in Chinese  Communist domination of the islands. A review of our policy is therefore in order.

現在看來我們在NSC 37/1、37/2和37/5提出有關於福爾摩沙和澎湖的政策目標實現的機會微乎其微──將這些島嶼由大陸中國人的控制下分離出來以抗拒中共。福爾摩沙和澎湖的情況正在系列性的惡化中，無論是幾年，又或者幾個月，將在中國共產黨對這些島嶼的統治下達到最高潮。因此這是我們的對應政策。

(註：NSC=National Security Council，美國國家安全議會，為協助美國總統處理外交和安全議題的極高層組織，主席為美國總統)







It would now seem clear that the only reasonably sure chance of  denying Formosa and the Pescadores to the Communists and insulating the islands from mainland authority would lie in the removal of the present Nationalist administrators from the islands and in establishment of a provisional international or U.S. regime which would invoke the principle of self-determination for the islanders  and would eventually, prior to a Japanese peace settlement, conduct  a plebiscite to determine the ultimate disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores. Formosan separatism is the only concept which has sufficient grass-roots appeal to resist communism.

現在看來很明確，唯一可以確保福爾摩沙和澎湖不被中共或任何大陸政權蹂躪的方法，
就是把現有的國民政府(Nationalist administrators)從島上移除掉，並且根據民族自決(self-determination)的原則在美國或國際的制度下為島上住民建立一個臨時政府，並在對日和約之前，透過公投(plebiscite)來自決(determine)最終的台澎處置方案。福爾摩沙分離主義是唯一能抗拒共產主義的概念。


Either would confront us with the eventual probable responsibility for removing the Chinese forces and many of the Chinese refugees by force to the mainland. This would involve a considerable amount of pushing people around, which would be unpleasant and might lead to serious moral conflicts within our own people and government.

這都可能導致我們使用武力強制移除中國軍隊和很多中國難民 (Chinese refugees)回大陸的最終責任。這將會產生許多迫害人們的事件，令人不悅並且可能在我們的政府和人民之間造成諸多人道衝突。


[Washington,] July 6, 1949.
[Annex]
Draft Memorandum Prepared in Policy Planning Staff
[Washington,] June 23, 1949.

A Possible Course of Action With Respect to Formosa and the Pescadores

Preliminary Comment


1. Any plan for the removal of the present authorities on Formosa and the Pescadores immediately encounters two serious obstacles: (a) there are now approximately 300,000 Chinese troops on the islands, who might resist such action and (b) this Government is more or less committed to Chinese sovereignty over the islands.

任何計畫要移除現有福爾摩沙和澎湖統治當局，都會立即遭遇兩種可能的障礙：(a) 那裏有大約30萬中國大軍在島上，可能會抵抗這樣的行動，還有(b) 本政府可能或多或少承認中國對這些島嶼的主權。


2. This paper does not attempt to provide a solution to the first of these obstacles. The answer to that question turns, in the last analysis, on whether the National Military Establishment is able and willing, on much the same principles which animated the British at Oran and Dakar, to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist forces now on the islands and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. For these reasons, this plan cannot be implemented unless the NME indicates such readiness and ability.

這份報告不對第一個障礙提供解答，那些答案根據最後的分析是 National Military Establishment(國家軍事機構，意思是這樣，不知道台灣的正式翻譯做什麼) 能做且願意的。在這樣的原則


(發現真的太長了....看誰可以直接幫我翻譯吧)


3. This paper does explore the possibilities for overcoming the political obstacles which stand in our way and for providing a justifiable political framework within which this Government might resort to a show of force or, if necessary, an active exercise of force in bringing about an administration independent of Chinese mainland control and enjoying solid anti-Communist popular support.

4. The recommendations which follow are suggestive rather than definitive. The general course of action being proposed here is so complex and full of unpredictable elements that, if accepted, it should be implemented with intelligent flexibility.

Course of Action

5. An inquiry should be instituted, along the lines of paragraph 2 above, as to whether the NME is able and willing to provide the requisite force to subdue and eject, if necessary, the Nationalist troops now on the islands, and to exert effective authority there for an interim period. While awaiting a reply from the NME, we should:

    a. unofficially, through an existing cut-out, sound out the Philippine Government in guarded terms slanted to its own interests regarding the proposed course of action set forth in paragraph 8 (The Filipinos are naturally going to be most reluctant to place themselves out in front on this score unless this Government gives them a greater sense of security against external attack.); (非正式的，試探菲律賓政府在這方面(我的註解：移除在台的中國人政權)的意向)

    b. in no-wise committing this Government, indirectly approach the Australian Government along the same lines;(試探澳大利亞政府同樣(我的註解：移除福爾摩沙的中國人政權)的事項)

    c. even more cautiously and tentatively explore the attitude of the Indian Government;(更小心且試探性的探究印度政府對此事的態度)
    d. prepare a chapter in the White Paper on China dealing with Formosa,86 with particular emphasis being laid upon Chinese misrule of the islands since VJ–Day (The White Paper, or at least the chapter on Formosa, should be issued before action is taken along the lines laid down in paragraph 7.); (在白皮書中增加福爾摩沙章節，強調中國人自從VJ-DAY後在島上的暴政)

    e. release for background purposes a small but steady stream of information of this character and information regarding the Formosan reemancipation movement.
(公布「福爾摩沙人再解放聯盟」的資料作為討論背景)(我的註解：第一個台獨建國團體)


6. If the reactions from all three Governments are negative, we should reexamine this paper in the light of what has been learned.

7. If the reactions are affirmative and if the NME expresses a willingness to make a show of force adequate to eliminate Nationalist troops from Formosa and the Pescadores, and if necessary to apply it, we should forthwith

    a. secretly and officially discuss with the Filipinos, Australians and, if progress has been made with Nehru,87 the Indians, the questions which were raised with them through informal contacts. We should state that if any one or all of them would take the initiative in the matter we would be prepared to support them and follow through on a practical basis. At this stage, the British, Canadians and New Zealanders should be secretly advised of these conversations;
    b. If there is general concurrence among the Philippine, Australian and Indian Governments that all or any one of them would raise the Formosan question as an issue requiring the attention of the powers which defeated Japan,† make our position clear along the lines set forth in the following paragraph.

8. In our view the problem of Formosa and the Pescadores can be broken down into two main components(福爾摩沙和澎湖問題可以被分解為兩個成分): (a) the need for a responsible and stable administration on the islands during the present period (在這時期需要一個穩固且負責的統治當局) while they are awaiting a stabilization of conditions in China and a final disposition at a Japanese peace settlement (當他們仍在等待中國局勢穩定以及最終處置的對日和約) , and (b) the need for discovering what the desires of the islanders are with regard to their future(島民對自己未來的渴望必須被重視) so that a just and constructive decision can be reached in the peace settlement on the basis of the self-determination(民族自決) of the inhabitants of Formosa and the Pescadores. We do not feel that we should take the initiative in seeking a solution of these issues because (a) they are of more vital concern to the Philippines and its neighbors than to us, (b) were we to do so, we would lay ourselves open to charges of “Big Power intervention” and (c) our hands are more or less tied by the commitments we made at Cairo and our actions in facilitating Chinese assmption of control over the islands. While we are most reluctant to take the lead in this question, we will vigorously and fully support those states which will take action along the following lines:

    a. Notification to all other powers at war with Japan that: The notifying states view with grave anxiety the mounting threat of chaos and civil strife spreading from the mainland of China to Formosa and the Pescadores(通知所有和日本作戰過的政權有關嚴重的焦慮，中國大陸的內戰和混亂正在被散布到福爾摩沙和澎湖列島); the Philippines recollect that it was only recently invaded and ravaged from those islands; the notifying powers cannot view without misgivings this new jeopardization of the security of all Southeast Asia; they therefore propose that the powers which are still legally at war with Japan should immediately concern themselves with the threatened turmoil in this part of the Japanese Empire which is still awaiting final disposition at a peace settlement; under Article 107 of the United Nations Charter,88 this question is reserved for action by the powers which are at war with Japan. The foregoing notification should be released for publication.
    b. Either in the same notification or in a separate statement to be issued simultaneously or shortly thereafter by all or any one of the above-mentioned notifying governments, the proposal should be made that, in view of the independent early history of Formosa and the Pescadores(福爾摩沙和澎湖早期獨立的歷史), of the shocking record of misrule during the past four years by the Chinese (中國人過去四年來在島上令人震驚的的暴政紀錄) and of the many pleas from repesentative Formosans for autonomy (以及許多典型的「福爾摩沙人」的自治請求), the powers which defeated Japan should promptly request the U.N. to conduct within one year a plebiscite(公民投票) regarding the ultimate disposition of the islands in accordance with the principles of self-determination(民族自決，整句意思為，擊敗日本的強權們應該迅速地要求聯合國在一年內按照「民族自決」的原則在島上舉辦「公民投票」作為「最終處置」)(我的註解：這就是黨國中華民國最恨要判死刑的台獨). It should be further proposed that the U.N. be requested in conducting the plebiscite to place the following alternatives before the inhabitants of the islands:(聯合國應該進一步為島上住民舉辦這些選項的「公民投票」)

        (1) Do you wish to be administered by (a) whatever government emerges on the mainland of China or (b) the present Chinese authorities on the island, or(你希望被「無論」中國大陸出現什麼政府或現行島上的中國人政權統治，「或」)

        (2) Do you wish another form of administration: (a) trusteeship under the United Nations, (b) independence, (c) any other?(你希望被另一個統治機構：(a)聯合國託管 (b)獨立 (c) 任何其他？)



These proposals should likewise be made public.

9. The day following the notification recommended in paragraph 8, this Government should:

    a. propose to the concerned governments (and announce publicly) that representatives of the states at war with Japan meet within one week’s time at Manila or Canberra to act on the notification (Objections may be raised to this proposal on the basis of inconvenience. Having made it, however, we can then acquiesce to a conference of Ambassadors in Washington or London.);
    b. announce publicly our reaction to the notification:
        (1) The final disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, parts of the former Japanese Empire, awaits a decision at a peace settlement with Japan;
(台澎列島的最終處置必須等到對日和約簽訂)

        (2) Formosa and the Pescadores are at present under Chinese military administration because the United States Government enabled the Chinese authorities at the time of the Japanese surrender to assume control over the islands, the decision to do this having flowed from the attitude expressed by the President in the Cairo Declaration;(中國人在那裏是因為開羅宣言，所以美國讓中國人去接受台澎列島的日軍投降)

        (3) Subsequent events in China and in Formosa have not justified the assumptions on which these actions were taken: Chinese administration(中國統治當局) on the islands has been rapacious and oppressive(貪婪的暴政) and the chaos and strife(混亂和傷害) which wracked and gutted China Proper now threaten to engulf these islands;


        (4) It was certainly not the intention of the American people, whose forces liberated Formosa and the Pescadores at so great a cost in blood and treasure (這並不是耗費大量鮮血和資金去解放福爾摩沙和澎湖的美國人民想看到的), that the Cairo Declaration and this Government’s action in facilitating Chinese control of the islands should have resulted in the creation of a menace to the stability and security of Southeast Asia and in the suffering which has been endured by the people of Formosa during the past four years;(開羅宣言和「這個(美國)政府」允許中國人統治這些島嶼的結果，已經危及到東南亞的穩定和安全，並且在過去四年裡讓福爾摩沙的人民受難)

        (5) Hoping that the Chinese administration on the islands might turn to more responsible and constructive policies, this Government has during the past four years scrupulously refrained from giving publicity to conditions on the islands and to the appeals for liberation made by representative Formosans to this Government;(希望島上的中國管理當局可以「轉向」更負責任且建設性的政策，「這個(美國)政府」在過去四年裡一直審慎壓抑公開島上情況以及福爾摩沙人對「這個(美國)政府」的解放要求)
        (6) Confronted with further deterioration rather than improvement and with the likelihood that the strife and misery on the Chinese mainland will spread to Formosa and the Pescadores, this Government can no longer in good conscience remain silent and inactive;(面對情況的惡化而不是改善，以及中國大陸上的衝突和不幸將會擴散到福爾摩沙和澎湖的可能，本(美)政府在良心驅使下無法再保持沉默和不作為。)

        (7) In view of all the foregoing, this Government declares its willingness to associate itself with the decision of the majority of the concerned powers regarding (a) the occupation and administration of the islands pending their disposition at a Japanese peace settlement and (b) the future political status of the islands based upon the results of the proposed plebiscite.(鑒於以上所有情況，「(美國)本政府」宣布決定聯合多數對島上與對日和約完成前的佔領和管理現狀感到擔憂的政權，這些島嶼的未來必須透過全民公投來決定。)

10. Simultaneously, we should prepare with utmost despatch and vigor to lay the groundwork for the meeting of the concerned powers. We should attempt to obtain an agreed position with all of them excepting the Russians and Chinese regarding the change in the occupation and administration of the islands, acquainting our friends of our willingness to carry the main weight of the military phase of the operation. To minimize the unilateral appearance of this operation, we should urge the Filipinos, Australians, Indians, Pakistanis, Canadians and New Zealanders to make at least token forces available for the military operation.(多國共同出兵來進行這個軍事行動)

11. At the same time, we should seek the collaboration of the Filipinos in providing all possible facilities for Formosan autonomy groups to make their case known both on the islands and elsewhere through broadcasts, publications, … and other channels.…

12. At the meeting of the concerned powers, we should endeavor to insure that the change-over on the islands be undertaken two weeks from the convocation of the meeting. Details regarding the forthcoming operation should be decided upon at the meeting. If China and the U.S.S.R. are represented at the conference, it will be necessary to conduct the work of the conference outside of the formal conference sessions which should then be devoted only to forcing through agreed positions at the most rapid possible pace.

13. As soon as decisions to that effect are reached at the conference, we should establish naval and air patrols designed to prevent access to the islands from the mainland. At the same time, we should do everything possible to facilitate the flight elsewhere of undesirable Chinese political and military elements now on the islands, including ships to speed the exodus.(在會議中作成決定後，我們必須立刻動用海上和空中巡邏來阻止大陸對這些島嶼的侵入。同時，我們必須動用可能的每件東西來遣送這島上「不受歡迎的」中國政治和軍事元素，包括船隻來加速移送。)

14. At this time, we should despatch an emissary to the key personality on the island, General Sun Li-jen. Because Sun, of all the generals on the island, has the least hopes on the mainland and is the most likely to resist a change imposed from without, he is capable of performing the desperate act of resisting vigorously. It would be judicious to present him with an opportunity for saving his position. He should be offered the alternative of declaring himself in favor of the Formosan cause and participating in the new occupation. If he accepts, we shall have made a major military gain in dividing the Chinese forces now on the island.(說拉攏孫立人然後可以得到現成的軍隊在福爾摩沙島上，我晚點有空在翻譯這段)

15. The Generalissimo(大元帥，說蔣介石) should be informed that if he wishes to remain on the island, he will be accorded the status of a political refugee.(如果他願意留在島上，他可以獲得政治難民身分)(美國對1945~1949年的中國來台尋求庇護者都稱為"refugee"，意思為難民)



16. During the take-over and the subsequent administration of the island, we should avoid so far as possible a conspicuous role. We should always remember that our aim is more to deny the islands to the Communists than to acquire responsibility for them and that our influence can be far more effectively exerted through indirect and discreet means rather than through unilateral heavy-handed measures.
81 This memorandum, PPS 53, according to an attached chit, was canceled on July 6; a note stated that the views of the Policy Planning Staff would be submitted by Mr. Kennan in a personal memorandum; latter not found in Department of State files.
82 January 19, p. 270.
83 February 3, p. 281.
84 March 1, p. 290.
* “The Joint Chiefs of Staff are staff of the opinion that any overt military commitment in Formosa would be unwise at this time. In spite of Formosa’s strategic importance, the current disparity between our military strength and our many global obligations makes it inadvisable to undertake the employment of armed force in Formosa, for this might, particularly in view of the basic assumption that diplomatic and economic steps have failed, lead to the necessity for relatively major effort there, thus making it impossible then to meet more important emergencies elsewhere.” (NSC 37/3, February 11, 1949.) [Footnote in the source text.]
85 National Military Establishment.
86 See Department of State, United States Relations With China (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 307; see also post, pp. 1365 ff.
87 Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister.
† As used in this paper “the powers which defeated Japan” and “the powers at war with Japan” refer only to those represented on the Far Eastern Commission: US, UK, USSR, China, Philippines, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, Netherlands, France—plus Pakistan and Burma. [Footnote in the source text.]
88 Signed at San Francisco, June 26, 1945; 59 Stat. (pt. 2) 1031, 1053.



韓戰救了蔣介石，卻殺了福爾摩沙

日本人和美國人都說福爾摩沙島上「農『礦』資源豐富」，中華民國跟我們說台灣「資源貧乏」而且缺乏「礦」產，我就問，台灣以前的金礦呢？都被國民黨濫挖完了然後全分給他們劃分的上等人階級「二戰後中國移民」了嗎？

這種「仇恨和對立」就是黨國中華民國挑起的阿，二戰後來台躲避戰亂的人就類似現在敘利亞躲到歐洲的難民一樣，求的只是安身立命並融入當地社會

但黨國中華民國的作法居然是把所有民營公司全掠奪一空，所有職位包括政府機關都只給這些來躲避戰亂的中國移民，然後還寫一堆垃圾論文說當年躲避戰亂的中國移民水準"遠比"原生台灣人高，可是台灣人教育普及度71%亞洲僅次於日本已達先進國家之列，開發程度在亞洲也名列前茅，當時的中國呢？



1956/2/25中華民國美援會會議紀錄

王蓬說：關於小型民營工業貸款計畫，本人特別聲明，這完全是美方主張辦的，我方並不願意而又不能不辦的。

江杓說：本人在擔任工業委員會召集人以後，才知道有小工業貸款事情，貸款分台幣和美金兩種，已經辦了三年。本人感覺貸款辦法不大妥當，曾問起美方為何將這款項交與商業銀行貸放，而不交政府辦理。他們的理由是：1.我們的國家缺少對於發展小工業有興趣而放款的商業銀行。2.當地銀行孰悉當地情形，同時商業銀行在貸款中要陪放20%血本有關，故在審核時比工業委員會的審核更要嚴密。

本人站在工業委員會召集人的立場，認為上面講的理由實在欠通：

1.工業委員會的技術人員，美方既然信任我們可以審核大的工業計劃，為何小工業計畫反而不信任交由我們來省和，這種態度跡近侮辱。工業在台灣，不論大小，互相都有牽連，例如電力的消費，原料的分配，彼此都有關係，並且都要顧到。商業銀行內既無工程師，也無工業委員會的代表從旁指導，他們並不知道工業委員會正在進行中的計畫，憑什麼他們可以審核小工業計畫，假如他們審定的一項小工業，其實已經包括在大工業計畫之內，將來大工業計劃完成後，他們就難免在打倒之列，經營的果然失敗了，貸出的款項也成了問題，所以本人說是部妥當的。

2.美方認為工業委員會是由大陸來的人所主持的，審核小工業貸款時，不免要偏袒大陸方面人士。

(這紀錄收藏於近史所，不然《保衛大台灣的美援》書中也有)

從這些解密文件可以看到，美國當年對黨國中華民國的要求，都是為台灣人民著想

然後這些在黨國人士的眼中看來就是「美國很過分的干預他國事務」，並且成為他們反西方的理由 (這段呼應我上面說的黨國學者寫的垃圾書，黨國時代沒邏輯不會推理的低能兒都能當學者了，現在都還有黨國學者的講法說美國要除掉蔣介石是對他國多過分等等，在巴哈我之前發的那串文也有這種回文)


具體地說，以固定價格計算之國民總生產，在日據時期以1936年為最高峰，戰後直到1955年才恢復該水準，在1960年只不過只較1936年多35％而已，而這期間台灣人口則約增加一倍，故1960年的人均實質國民總生產仍較1936年少32％。(註24)在此期間，生產相對減退，人口爆增，又有沈重的軍事防衛支出需要，台灣確實面臨嚴重的進口壓力，當時最能換取外匯的出口物資仍以糖及米為主。在1950年至1960年的十一年間，兩者累計出口金額達10億美元，佔同一期間累計出口總金額的68﹒9％;佔同一期間累計進口總金額的44﹒4％；佔同一期間累計政府外匯進口(扣除美援進口及其他進口)總金額的79﹒3％。

引用自《『馬關條約一百年一台灣命運的回顧與展望』國際學術研討會所發表的論文》
(米糖出口經濟是日治時代奠基的)

我小時候看一堆電視劇演台灣人被日本人欺負的很慘，跑去問我阿公，我阿公跟我說那都假的，當下我腦袋裡像被雷劈到，第一次碰到那種無法理解的震撼感腦袋一片空白，但還是隱約有種感覺，當局在醜化以前那個時代。

很好笑吧，黨國中華民國到1960年代和至少之後幾年都還讓台灣人過著比日治時代更窮困的生活，憑什麼做一堆那種假的電視劇？真不要臉

黨國中華民國一直到1960年都還在仰賴日治時代奠基的米糖出口經濟，不是說自己發展台灣經濟多行？



(這篇看誰可以幫我把小屋連結放上ptt有人轉貼的討論串，他們說想看原文，我這裡有原文)

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(巴哈文章的臉書讚每過一陣子會被清空，原因未明，本圖攝於12/2/2016)